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THE MEDIA AS A SPACE 
OF DELIBERATION BASED ON THE 
EXAMPLE OF MEDIA DISCOURSE 
ON SELECTED ENERGY TOPICS -
CONCLUSION
The analyses presented in this volume provide the foundations for attempting 
to diagnose the mainstream media discourse as a space for public delibera­
tion. We perceive this space normatively, from the angle of the characteristics 
discussed above, such as inclusiveness, diversity of points of view, dialogical- 
ity, strength of argument, looking for the points of contact and mapping the 
differences between groups of actors, as well as their forming of coalitions 
and oppositions. The objective of this is to identify social problems and guide­
lines for their resolution, which then become the object of public policies. 
Important here is transparent presentation of interests, with priority given 
to the public interest -  in the sense both of the good of the majority and of 
a beneficial resolution of problems for disadvantaged groups. The space of 
deliberation referring to media discourse is thus treated as a normative ideal 
of a symbolic space in which the discourses of various epistemic communities 
are present, visible to themselves and referring to one another. Moreover, 
these communities have the chance to become visible also to those who are 
not actively involved in them -  viewers, readers, audiences in general. But 
this is not all. The polyphonic and intertextual space of this co-existence of 
discourses by its nature creates conditions for collective deliberation on 
issues of importance to society. The confrontation of various points of view 
is supposed to produce a better solution (than interest groups' initial pro­
posals], but not to give the advantage to a specific point of view (e.g. through
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eristic processes] or make any one community dominant. At the same time, 
though, these normative criteria lead to critical analysis and evaluation of 
the communicative processes taking place in the media space.
Of course, the rift between the realm of ideal premises and the practice of 
how discourses function in the media is not meant to emphasise the patholo­
gies of the latter, but to point to the need for and forms of action to reorganise 
this practice; to critically analyse not only the process of defining the goals 
and instruments for achieving it but also the norms that these processes 
will follow in the public sphere. The authors therefore do not treat media 
discourses as the only public discourses, but as those which are visible in 
the media space.
The many differences in the media discourses on the various topics are 
described in detail in the previous chapters. Yet certain similarities can also 
be seen. Energy issues are given prime importance in the media representa­
tions. Where the subject of energy occurs in the media, it is treated as an 
important subject, particularly for economic and political reasons. This claim 
to importance is expressed in the frequent publication of information on the 
front pages of newspapers, functioning as the main topic of a programme or 
statement (while energy issues are also covered in relation to other impor­
tant subjects], and involving in the discussion people in high positions in 
state and business structures identified with power (decision makers]. The 
leading actors in the discourse describe this subject as crucial to citizens, the 
economy and the country. The common good that is so significant in deliber­
ation processes is defined here in terms of geopolitical interest (which large 
economic interests are to serve]. Although the rivalry of global economies 
and struggle for the dynamic of economic growth demarcate the thinking on 
acquisition and use of energy, it is hard to speak of a global perspective, as all 
decisions are taken at a domestic level, where the primary interests are those 
of the state. The discourse is lacking a clearly outlined global perspective of 
perception of energy issues, for example their importance for the planet or 
inequalities on a global scale.
Despite the attributed and unquestionable “importance,” these issues 
differ in terms of popularity. We can understand this in two ways. First, 
popularity refers to the frequency with which a given topic is covered in 
the media; this is decided by the dynamic of political and economic events. 
Plans, decisions, and meetings of key actors become a pretext for presenting 
and discussing energy issues. Hot topics in our period of analysis were the 
construction of a nuclear power station in Poland and the search for shale 
gas. Wind energy was discussed less frequently, and more in the local than 
the national media. This goes hand in hand with political priority being as­
signed to individual investments. Wind energy is the form least likely to be 
presented as of strategic importance for the state.
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Second, popularity can refer to the way in which energy issues are present­
ed to readers. Popular contents are presented in simplified form without the 
need for specialist knowledge or careful following of the subject, and are often 
embellished with sensation -  like the corruption scandals over investments 
or tempestuous protests. They are usually addressed to the so-called "general 
reader,” without specific profiling, whereas less popular contents are published 
with a specific target group in mind. We can thus observe that media address­
ing contents to people interested in economic issues (e.g. Rzeczpospolita or Puls 
Biznesu) are more likely to cover energy issues than media with a socio-cultural 
profile. It is also less common to present energy issues in terms associated 
with citizens' everyday lives: work, functioning of households, quality of life, 
local affairs. Perhaps the form of energy that comes closest to this everyday 
dimension is wind, which is rooted in the realities of communes and districts 
more than the others. Wind power is described in terms of neighbourhood, 
health and quality of life, but also of local tensions and conflicts, although even 
here these categories are simply present, rather than dominant.
The economisation of the discourse that is characteristic of presenta­
tion of energy issues is an element of power relations. It serves to achieve 
political interests, by strengthening or weakening the positions of those in 
power. This power is legitimised by specialist expert knowledge, which is to 
a great extent macroeconomic. It is interesting to note that the actors did not 
always treat the areas of ignorance and uncertainty that shone through in all 
the analysed topics as barriers to taking action. On the contrary, sometimes, 
as with the case of shale gas, knowledge gaps become a distinct impetus for 
action presented as the only way of securing practical knowledge. This kind 
of knowledge can then lead to economic calculations.
Topics of social consultations are very infrequent in the media discourses, 
while reflection on participatory ways of dealing with areas of uncertainty 
is essentially entirely absent. Not only do the media not consciously create 
discursive norms favouring deliberation, but they also fail to promote the 
very idea, to educate in the possibilities and tools for conducting it, only 
occasionally calling for broader consultations, rarely giving information 
about the processes of social dialogue -  meetings taking place and the results 
thereof -  and even more seldom of possibilities of participation.
Although the media discourses on energy issues are characterised by 
various degrees of inclusiveness and diversity of the positions expressed, 
studies conducted in other countries also point to a domination of the eco­
nomic perspective. Despite the growing visibility of climate change and calls 
for a transition to a low-emissions economy, these discussions always take 
place within the current economic structures (Uusi-Rauva, Tienari 2008). 
They seem incapable either of initiating the radical changes that scientists 
deem necessary for solving the ecological crisis (Dryzek 1997; Prasad, Elm-
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es 2005) or of effectively opening the communicative space to alternative 
perspectives and values.
In the Polish media, these structures model the discourse according to 
categories of profitability, economic risk, benefits and losses. They are rep­
resented by actors who are influential in a communicative sense and have 
high media visibility. The analyses show that other actors, such as those rep­
resenting NGOs or informal citizens’ groups, though present in the discourse, 
find it hard to occupy independent positions. Rather, they act as points of ref­
erence for the dominant actors. The asymmetry of these positions is plainly 
felt and legitimised by the (rather arbitrary) reference to the common good. 
Actors from within the system (representing the strong fields of politics and 
economics) often appear in the role of representatives of the state interest 
(equated with the general interest of citizens), whereas those from outside 
are depicted as representing the interests of minorities and individual groups, 
or even rival interests to the Polish state.
The economic perspective, expressed by the code profitable-unprofitable, 
is spliced with the political one, and it is this way of speaking and thinking 
about energy issues that is very much dominant in all the subject areas. 
Economic development, energy prices and costs of investments define the 
parameters of the discussion on Poland’s energy future, at state level but also 
at the local level -  voivodeships and districts. The very idea of development 
and civilisational progress is strongly equated with economic growth, as it 
is GDP growth that is expected to guarantee the prosperity and security of 
citizens. A slowdown in growth represents a threat for the future of Poles 
and places a question mark against their economic security. The alternative 
perception of progress referring to sustainable development, quality of life, 
and eco-development is marginal and confined to words. These ideas often 
appear as an element of image-based communication, but without being 
discussed more widely. They usually function either as slogans in the declar­
ative statements of politicians and business leaders or as labels attached to 
movements contesting the dominant paradigm of thinking about the future 
of energy. In neither case are they accompanied by profound reflection, 
extended arguments or even an outline of space for debate. Interestingly, 
although the issues associated with aspects of climate change, CO2 emissions 
and the EU's climate policy appear in all the topics, they do not constitute 
a fundamental point of reference for the main issue organising the discourses. 
Even with wind energy, with the strongest allusions to ecology, environmen­
tal protection and low-emissions technologies, dominant are local concerns 
associated with specific investment projects or the future of the districts. 
Research on the media discourse on wind energy in the USA, despite the in­
creased significance and power of wind farms there after 2007, demonstrated 
a similar trend (Stephens et al. 2009).
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The media discourse on energy in Poland is elite-driven and generally 
exclusive, accompanied by the belief that this is a difficult subject requiring 
specialist knowledge. In all three fields, the threshold of competences enti­
tling actors to speak out was high, something underlined by those who do 
participate. Citizens are assigned positions of ignorance and lack of interest, 
which is also illustrated by the results of opinion polls. Mechanisms of exclu­
sion are much more evident than those of inclusion. In all the subject areas, 
the same categories of actors are dominant (although the specific entities 
vary]: politicians and business representatives, supported by experts, mostly 
from the field of economics. Institutional actors -  states, ministries and gov­
ernment offices, and business organisations (banks, companies, consulting 
agencies] -  play an important role in all three discourses. NGOs, political 
parties and research institutions appear in the background.
Whereas, as we have seen, certain groups of actors present in the dis­
course are clearly marginalised (NGOs, civic leaders and activists, local politi­
cians, residents], many are entirely absent. If we compare the communicative 
activity in energy/environmental issues in Poland and Germany, for example, 
what is striking in the Polish media is the lack or very limited presence of 
consumer organisations, trade unions, schools and teachers, artists and social 
scientists (apart from economists].
Despite the differentiation of the discourses in many respects, as shown by 
the previous chapters, the media space is lacking radical discourses giving an 
alternative to the dominant paradigm. Even the internet space, which could be­
come an area for developing and communicating different views and visions for 
energy, does not fulfil these expectations. The areas of internet communication 
that we analysed are not a deliberative space. Rather, they are characterised by 
similar trends to traditional media -  press, radio, television -  meaning above 
all dominance of the economic perspective, instrumental use of technological 
knowledge (scientific data supporting ideological goals], and a low level of 
dialogicality. What sets them apart is a higher level of dispersal of contents, 
their fragmentary nature and the fact that the contents which are often linked 
to other statements do not indicate which ones. They constitute a commentary, 
sometimes only loosely linked to substance. Of course, this does not mean that 
the internet does not provide possibilities of communication to groups or indi­
viduals contesting the dominant structures and perspectives. Yet those that it 
does offer are barely visible in the public space. Owing to capitalist mechanisms 
associated with marketing, market positioning, and access to costly commu­
nication technologies, professionalisation of network communication, strong, 
well-organised actors possessing economic capital, i.e. beneficiaries of the 
present system, gain much better conditions for organising the discursive space 
around themselves in a way that others can perceive. This is the first condition 
of having real influence on what happens in the communicative public space.
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In their accounts of the individual subject areas explored in this book, the 
authors analysed in detail the resources used by actors to build and maintain 
their influential position, but also the mechanisms deciding on who is per­
mitted a voice in the discourse and who is not. The next question is the claim 
to importance given to these discourses and assuring them a broader reach 
than one's own epistemic community. According to Giandomenico Majone, 
"the most important function both of public deliberation and of policy-mak­
ing is defining the norms that determine when certain decisions are to be 
regarded as policy problems” (Majone 1989: 23-24). Furthermore, he argues 
that because uncertainty of the future is so ubiquitous in policy making, the 
values of those responsible for it are of great importance (Majone 1989: 26). 
When reality is characterised by a high level of variability and risk associated 
with making decisions, one of the mechanisms used to justify their course 
is reference to values. The criteria of suitability, pertinence and significance 
are therefore removed from the axionormative system. This explains the 
tendency of the actors in our analysed discourses to refer to values -  devel­
opment and progress, security, patriotism, freedom -  although the semantic 
fields of these concepts prove to be varied (e.g. security). Use of this value 
(in various domains and contexts) constitutes the well-known strategy of 
securitisation of discourse, serving legitimisation of political actions and 
decisions (cf. Fischhendler et al. 2014).
Our analyses clearly pointed to certain blank spaces in the media discours­
es. The public sphere created in media communication is not representative 
of what goes on beyond its boundaries. Although it indicates the existence of 
controversies or conflict axes, it does not form a map of the diverse positions 
and views. The actors whose voices are heard occupy unequal positions, 
and the relations that exist between them can be described as relations of 
dominance and discrimination, if only because of the symbolic resources 
attributed to these positions (e.g. knowledge and ignorance, importance 
and unimportance etc.). Many arguments and standpoints articulated in the 
non-media space are not found in media sources, and some actors do not 
exist in it at all.
The authors of the analyses also point to the rational nature of the debates. 
This rationality is expressed, for example, in basing persuasive mechanisms 
on so-called hard numerical data, something that does not aid deliberation. 
Emotions, usually attributed to marginalised actors and confronted with the 
clinical reason of experts giving calculations, do not help with better mutual 
understanding, but rather with labelling behaviours and depreciating po­
sitions that contest the dominant economic-technocratic order. Rationality 
donning the mask of quantifiability is illusory. The data quoted, often based 
on estimates or documenting, for example, distributions of opinion, lacks 
any extended commentary to explain the specific details. It is also often pre­
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sented fragmentarily. Statistical and other economic data is thrown around, 
and the actors presented the evidence constructed in this way as facts. Yet 
this evidence is always based on context, its meaning resulting from a con­
crete situation and needing to be framed appropriately (Majone 1989). An 
excellent example is data on the forecasts of shale gas resources in Poland. 
This data, presented as facts, varies hugely in the discourse. Measurable and 
objective figures can be used for subjective and ideological interpretations, 
and are also frequently a type of resource to which actors other than those 
citing them in a given situation (interview, programme) do not have access, 
which makes it difficult to discuss them.
The risks associated with planning future actions are also quantified. 
All the discourses we analysed are more prescriptive or proscriptive than 
descriptive -  meaning that they more often refer to what will or should 
occur than to existing facts. In this way, the discourses construct visions 
of the future saddled with a high level of uncertainty (although the actors 
frequently colonialise this future, presenting it in a language of facts, rather 
than prognoses). One of the ways of reducing this uncertainty is transforming 
it into quantifiable risk, which is usually economic. In the other areas the 
future sometimes serves to put off troublesome problems, removing them 
from the agenda of current issues (e.g. solving the problem of radioactive 
waste or the environmental consequences of shale extraction technologies). 
In these cases, the mechanism of reduction of uncertainty is trust in the state, 
administrative services, science or the law. The actors who support a given 
investment assume that undertaking actions will in future bring solutions 
to controversial questions (we know what we do not know, and how to get 
the missing knowledge). Their opponents, meanwhile, point to the uncer­
tainty additionally exacerbated by taking actions whose consequences are 
currently hard to predict (we do not know what we do not know). To refer to 
the concepts of futurisation and defuturisation in the sense coined by Niklas 
Luhmann (1976), we can state that in the analysed discourse on selected 
energy issues, the actors rather seek to narrow the options of the future to 
one desired scenario (defuturisation) than to "open the future” by permitting 
various scenarios to be constructed in order to discuss them further (futur- 
isation). Despite the discrepancy in the preferences of the various groups of 
actors and their visions of the energy system, from the interpretation of the 
past (Poland’s own and that of other countries) is derived a priority of tech­
nological and economic development common to everybody. Although the 
politicians stress that the various energy sources are complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive, the actors in the discourse often treat them as rivals.
To sum up the media discourses on energy issues, I would state that they 
are dominated by a positive attitude towards the technologies they discuss 
and solutions to energy questions. If this attitude is not enthusiastic, it is
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based on more or less directly expressed acceptance of the planned actions. 
Opposing positions and contesting discourses have considerably less media 
visibility. Furthermore, the dominant discourse in the media is limited in 
terms of analysis of social aspects taking into consideration the perspective of 
various groups of citizens. For example, the discourse contains scant mention 
of issues connected to inequalities -  the participation of various groups of 
citizens in the risk and in the expected benefits, or the consequences of indus­
trialisation of originally rural land. The economisation and tendency for the 
discourse to refer to state level means that problems remain abstract for the 
majority of consumers of the media, while the benefits are often expressed in 
the language of ideology. A pretext for covering energy issues is often given 
by political decisions or economic investments, and the statements of the 
main actors are then clearly used to persuade.
It is worth comparing this observation with the results of research on 
the attitude of European societies to various energy technologies (nuclear 
power or fracking), according to which Poles usually exhibit a higher level of 
acceptance than citizens of other countries (cf. Eurobarometer studies). The 
media discourses, which give precedence to business-political projects, take 
place at the macro level, and present energy issues as abstract problems for 
the average citizen, but in a persuasive and often ideological way, are of no 
small significance here.
The question we asked in this book about the character of the media 
space in the context of deliberation and the rules applying there demands 
an answer. The analyses that we have presented paint a picture far removed 
from a dialogical space searching for a broad and mature agreement. It might 
therefore seem that the mechanisms of exclusion and domination shown 
so clearly will lead to the perception of this space as an arena in which the 
individual interests and differing perspectives of actors clash. Yet the battle 
taking place here is seldom one in which the arms are the arguments of 
representatives of various worlds. While the main skirmish goes on at the 
fringes, it is only the strongest who flex their muscles in the arena itself. So 
it is the key actors of the economic and political sectors who dominate the 
media space. Despite the divergent interests (e.g. climate policy and economic 
objectives) or the mutual unpredictability of partners (on the one hand the 
instability of political decisions as an element of economic risk, and on the 
other the fluctuations of the economic situation), they form a kind of coalition 
symbolically supported by the cited experts from the circles of science and 
economic consulting. This is all fortified by such values as energy independ­
ence, stability of supplies and citizens’ security. From time to time, from the 
crowd congregated outside the arena, another actor is summoned, who is 
not always au fait with the rules of the game. But the crowd view this actor, 
without the position strengthened by the symbolic resources of recognised
The media as a space of deliberation based on the example of media discourse... 185
knowledge and status, as weak and helpless, or alternatively agitated and 
aggressive, determinedly fighting for attention. In this sense, then, the media 
discourses are closer to the logic of Habermasian dramaturgical action than 
to communicative action.
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